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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E YEN ODDS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant.

~IILTON

vs.
C. NIELSON,

I'
Case No.
~ 10814

Defendrmt-llespundcnt.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiff asserts that the defendant violated
certain provisions of a mining lease with respect to
mining properties in San Juan County, and that as a
result of such breaches, plaintiff is entitled to recover
damages ( 1) for breach of contract; ( 2) for unlawful
mining and removing of certain ores from the mme;
and ( 3) for unlawful detainer of the mine.

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
District Judge A. II. Ellett heard testimony and
received other evidence for five days and after some-

1

what brief oral argument at the conclusion of the trial,
gave counsel 30 days each within which to submit
written briefs. Prior to the time that the briefs were
to be submitted, Judge Ellett was appointed to the
State Supreme Court. Upon instruction by the Judge,
the Clerk of the court entered a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of
$9,000.00, but there was no opportunity afforded for
preparation or consideration of Findings of Fact or
Conclusions of Law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant asks this court to enter orders
and make determinations appropriate to accomplish
the fallowing results:
A. Determining and adjudicating that the damages awarded to the plaintiff were inadequate as a
matter of law on the plaintiff's cause of action asserting a breach of contract (The First Cause of Action
in No. 2714) and that plaintiff is entitled to damages
m the sum of $29,188.53.

B. Determining and adjudicating that the plain-

tiff is entitled to recover on its cause of action asserting
that the defendant was guilty of unlawfully mining and
removing valuable ores from the Pete mine (The Second Cause of Action in No. 2714) and is entitled to
recover damages in the sum of $73,319.89, trebled, under
40-1-12 UCA 1953.
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C. Determining and adjudicating that plaintiff is
entitled to recover substantial damages as a result of
defendant's unlawful detainer of the Pete mine from
April I, 1966 until December 16, 1966, and that the
amount of damages sustained is $1,045.00 per month.
D. Determining and adjudicating that plaintiff is
entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee.
In the event this court determnes that the plaintiff is entitled to substantial damages and that the
amount awarded by the trial court is inadequate as
a matter of law but is unable to make any determination
()f damages from the evidence in the record, plaintiff
moves the court for the appointment of a master for
the determination of the amount of damages on each
of plaintiff's claims.
STATE.MENT OF FACTS
On the 1st day of April, 1963, the parties executed
a mining lease upon certain unpatented mining claims
in San Juan County ref erred to for convenience as the
"Pete Claims". Paragraph 4 of that lease (Ex. A
to Complaint, 2715) provides as fallows:
"4. Rights of Lessee. The Lessee shall have

the right and privilege during the term of this
agreement to conduct exploratory drilling, mining
and metallurgical operations on the mining properties subject to this agreement and to extract,
produce, remove, process and ship or otherwise
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dispose of ores, minerals and mineral products,
provided nevertheless, that the maximum dimensions of any drift cut, drilled or made by the
Lessee which is necessary as a haulage way shall
not exceed a distance of 10 feet wide and 10 feet
high. Lessee shall have the right to make cross
cuts, provided that pillars shall be left standing
not less than 20 feet square or equivalent. Lessee
expressly covenants and agrees that he shall conduct or suffer to be conducted no stoping or
stripping on said mining properties without the
written consent of Lessor. Said practices shall be
applicable to any and all underground mining
on said property, but shall not be applicable to
open pit mining thereon. Failure to comply with
the terms of this paragraph shall constitute justification to the Lessor to cancel this lease without
notice to Lessee."
The undisputed evidence was that Paragraph 4 of the
1963 Lease was identical to Paragraph 4 of prior mining leases executed by the same parties upon the same
property in 1960 and 1962 (See Para. 4 of Exs. 12
and 14). The original lease between the parties was
prepared by Robert Anderson, one of the attorneys for
the defendant in the instant litigation (Tr. 166). The
draft submitted to the defendant, from which the original lease was substantially copied, provided that the
drifts would be limited in size to 8 feet by 8 feet, and
that the pillars would be 40 feet square (Tr. 167).
The provisions of Paragraph 4 of the draft were
4

changed at the defendant's request to prescribe the
size of the drifts to be 10 feet by 10 feet, and the size
of the pillars to be 20 feet square (Tr. 167). The
evidence is uncontroverted that the purpose of these
jJrovisions was to limit the ore which the defendant
could remove from the mine. In ordinary mining
practice involving uranium 85% to 90% recovery of
the ore is considered good recovery without any mining
restrictions. The restrictions of Paragraph 4 of the
Lease in the instant litigation would permit the Lessee
to recover from 60% to 65% of the ore without violating the provisions of the paragraph (Tr. 146).
The principal officers and directors of the plaintiff corporation were James L. Menlove, an engineer
who resided in Bountiful (Tr. 14) and Melvin K.
Dalton, whose business interests were primarily in
livestock and cattle. Mr. Dalton resided at :Monticello
(Tr. 161, 162). As a result of past experience in their
dealings with the defendant, and particularly in view
of their interest in other business ventures, neither
.Jlr. Menlove nor Mr. Dalton had any occasion to visit
the Pete mine for a period of ·at least a year prior to
the early Spring of 1966 (Tr. 23, 174). Mr. Dalton
and Mr. Menlove both testified that while they had
told l\Ir. Nielson upon various occasions that his operations were borderline in some instances; that his drifts
were too wide; that the pillars were slightly too small
(Tr. 99, 100, 104, 105, 106), his operations were substantially in compliance with the requirements of Para5

graph 4, until the conduct which resulted in this lawsuit (Tr. 24, 72, 113, 17 4).
In the early Spring of 1966, fallowing a v1s1t to
the mine by l\1r. Dalton, the property was examined
by both Dalton and Menlove. It was obvious that
since their last visit the defendant had mined out large
rooms in the Pete mine. He had stoped and stripped
the property, and the drifts, cross-cuts and pillars
all substantially violated the provisions of Paragraph
4 (Tr. 108, see the photographs in evidence as Exhibits 13-21). Plaintiff gave defendant notice to quit
the premises (Tr. 106, 107) . Notwithstanding such
notice, Mr. Nielson shipped $11,269.97 worth of ore
during April of 1966 (Settlement sheet dated May 2,
1966, 1st sheet of Ex. 7; the figure includes haulage allowance of $3,444.05). He then ceased his mining
operations but refused to release or deliver the premises
to the plaintiff. After attempting to get trial settings
during the Summer of 1966, the plaintiff finally succeeded in getting a hearing on the merits in December.
The testimony at the trial was to a substantial
extent uncontroverted. The plaintiff's evidence consisted of descriptions by witnesses of the conditions
of the mined area and evidence of damage. Plaintiff
proved, through James Menlove, who was an experienced engineer with operating experience in mining,
the tonnage of ore removed from the mine in violation
of Paragraph 4. Shipping records and settlement sheets
were introduced to prove the average value of the ore
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removed, and using a conversion factor of 17 cubic
foot per ton and the calculations of the average value
per ton of the ore shipped, plaintiff demonstrated the
actual market value in place of the ore taken from the
mine by the defendant in violation of the agreement.
Samuel Arentz, a highly qualified mining engineer
from Salt Lake City, testified concerning the areas
from which the ore was removed in violation of the
terms of Paragraph 4, the value of the ore in place,
the cost of the removal of the ore wrongfully shipped
by the defendant, and the amount of profit which the
plaintiff would have made on the ore if it had been
left in place according to the provisions of the paragraph. There was a slight variation in the results computed by Mr. Menlove and Mr. Arentz. For the purposes of this appeal, it is assumed that the evidence
least favorable to the appellant would be used in making
the appropriate computations. On this basis, a summary of the evidence is as fallows:
Tonnage wrongfully removed ------------ 3,031 tons
Average grade of ore-.2384 % U308
@ $19.35 piton (haulage not included) $58,649.85
Cost of removal of tonnage wrongfully removed @ $6.75 piton ____________
20,459.25
Net value of ore ~rongfully removed ____ $38,190.60
Royalties paid on tonnage removed
@ $2.97 piton x 3,031 tons ______________
9,002.07
Even Odds, Inc., damage for ore
wrongfully removed ---------------------------29,188.54

7

A brief explanation is required with respect to
these figures. Samuel Arentz testified that 3,398 tons
of ore were wrongfully removed (Tr. 120-124, Ex.
25). He testified that his calculations and tabulations
were made with reasonable engineering certainty and
in accordance with generally accepted engineering principles (Tr. 137). Judge Ellett indicated, in the course
of the trial, that he believed that the tonnage in Area
1 in the ceiling of the normal 10 foot x 10 foot drift
should not be allowed as damage, because Melvin
Dalton told the defendant sometime during 1965 to
determine the thickness of the ore in this area. The
judge believed that defendant was led to believe he
could mine the ore above the drift (Tr. 393). It ap·
pears from the exhibits that a volume of ore seven feet
high, 10 feet wide and 65 feet long, or 4550 cubic feet,
would have been disallowed on this theory. At 17 cubic
feet per ton, therefore, 267 tons should have been reduced from .Mr. Arentz's calculations, leaving 3,031
tons of ore wrongfully removed. It is to be observed
that neither the defendant nor his expert witness,
Elbert E. Lewis, a mining engineer from Grand Junction, Colorado, challenged the accuracy of the Arentz
figures. In fact, Lewis admitted that he and a civil
engineer whose testimony was not offered checked the
accuracy of plaintiff's maps and found them to be substantially accurate (Tr. 312).
The average grade of ore taken from the mine
during the period in question is ascertainable from the
settlement sheets in evidence as Exhibits 7 and 15.
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The average value per ton is ascertainable from the
:-iame documents. There c.:an be no quarrel with the fact
that the average grade of U30S is .2384%, and the
ayerage value per ton during the period under con~;deration is $19.35. The value per ton times the number of tons wrongfully removed is simply a mathematical calculation.
Arentz testified that he would estimate that
if the provisions of Paragraph 4 had been observed,
the cost of removal of the remaining ore would have
been $6.75 per ton (Tr. 129). l\fr. Menlove estimated
the cost at $6.00 per ton (Tr. 42). The defendant
testified that the cost of runnning an eight-foot drift
was only $4.00 per ton. Obviously the cost of removal
of ore when a drift is already in existence would be
substantially less. The removal cost of $6. 75 per ton,
therefore, is substantially more favorable to the defendant than any other figure in the record on this
phase of the case. The cost per ton times the number
of tons wrongfully removed is a mathematical calculation.
~Ir.

It is conceded that the plaintiff was paid an average
royalty of $2.97 per ton on the ore shipped prior to
April, 1966. Actually, no royalty has been received
by the plaintiff at this time for the tonnage shipped
by the defendant after he was given notice to quit the
premises. Even so, in its computation of damages
plaintiff-appellant has applied the average royalty to
all of the tonnage in question. Once again, the figure
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used is conservative, and the defendant cannot have
any reasonable objection to its use.
It is important to observe that the only figure
used about which there could have been any possible
argument is the number of tons wrongfully removed.
The defendant did not purport to offer any evidence
on this point. The only evidence concerning damage~
offered by defendant was with respect to a legal theory
which the appellant believes was not applicable to
the case. This matter is discussed more fully at pages
17 et. seq. of the brief.

Plaintiff proved that the gross value of the ore
unlawfully removed, without regard to the costs of
mining or the costs of shipping, was $73,319.89. There
was no dispute that if plaintiff's recovery under the
tort theory was limited to the amount of ore removed
after defendant received the notice to quit the premises,
that it should recover approximately $11,269.97. In
other words, it was undisputed that after receiving the
notice to quit, the defendant removed $11,267.97 worth
of ore, represented by a settlement sheet dated May 2,
1966 and in evidence as the first sheet of Exhibit 7.
The plaintiff proved that the mine had been operated by a number of persons beginning with Ranwick, Ltd., a Canadian corporation, between 1959 and
the time of the trial.The mine had produced approximately one million dollars wqrth of ore (Tr. 371, 372).
Defendant's expert witness conceded that the mme
appeared to be capable of additional production. De10

feuJant's counsel stipulated, in fact, that mineable ore
is left in the mine (Tr. 320). Plaintiff received $76,:WO. 78 over the period covered by the Nielson leases
as rentals or royalties (Tr. 137, 138). Since Nielson's
operations covered the period from February 24, 1900
(Exhibit 12) to l\Iarch 30, 1966, a period of 73 months,
'.t is certainly reasonable to believe that the right to
the possession of the mine was worth at least $1,045.00
per month, or stated conversely, that plaintiff was
damaged in the amount of $1,045.00 per month by
reason of defendant's unlawful detainer from :'.\larch
:JO to December 16.
It \Vas undisputed that the defendant's operations
constituted a violation of Paragraph 4 of the lease upon
the Pete claims. It was also uncontradicted that the
defendant did not perform the work requirements
contained in the lease upon the Lee claims and the
School Section. While the trial court did not make
any Finding of Fact or Conclusions of Law, the J udgment entered at his direction is conclusive that the
trial judge found that the defendant was in default
under both leases and that the plaintiff was entitled
to recover damages at least for breach of contract
(Tr. 393). Judge Ellett indicated at the conclusion
of the evidence that it was his view at that time that
the plaintiff could not recover under the Second Cause
of Action in No. 2714. The appellant assumes in this
brief, therefore, that the court ruled against the plaintiff on the theory that the defendant wrongfully extracted and carried away ore from the Pete mine. The
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court stated at the time of oral argument that it was
of the view that the defendant was guilty of unlawful
detainer of the Pete mine between approximately
April l, 1966 and the time of the trial, but that plai 11 •
tiff was entitled to be awarded only nominal damages.
Plaintiff assumes that such theory prevailed when the
judgment was entered.
Plaintiff appeals upon four grounds:
( l) Based upon the undispued evidence and
as a matter of law, plaintiff was entitled to recover
a substantially greater amount of damages for
breach of contract than the sum awarded by the
trial court. The trial judge applied an improper
theory of damage for breach of contract.

( 2) On the undisputed evidence and as a
matter of law plaintiff was entitled to recoYer
under the Second Cause of Action in Civil No.
2714, i.e., it is undisputed that the defendant
wrmigfully and willfully extracted and carried
away from the Pete mine certain ore and that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover three times the value
of such ore without respect to deductions for labor
bestowed or expenses incurred in removing, transporting, selling, or preparing said ore for market
under the provisions of Section 40-1-12 of the
Utah Code.
(3) Plaintiff is entitled to recover substantial
damages for unlawful detainer of the Pete mine
between April l, 1966 and December 16, 1966,
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the amount of such damages to be based upon the
opera ting experience of the mine and the amount
which plaintiff received as rentals or royalties
during the period when it had possession of the
property.
( 4) Under the contract, plaintiff is entitled

to attorney's fees.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AMOUNT OF DA.MAGES A'VARDED TO PLAINTIFF ON THE BREACH OF
CONTRACT THEORY 'VAS INADEQUATE
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The First Cause of Action in No. 2714 asserts the
propositon that defendant violated the provisions of
Paragraph 4 of the mining lease upon the Pete claims
dated April 1, 1963. The lease clearly and unequivocally provides that "the maximum dimensions of any
drift cut, drilled or made by the lessee which is necessary
as a haulage way shall not exceed a distance ten feet
wide and ten feet high. Lessee shall have the right to
make cross-cuts provided that pillars shall be left standing not less than 20 ft. square or equivalent. Lessee
expressly covenants and agrees that he shall conduct
or suffer to be conducted no stoping or stripping on
said mining properties without the written consent of
Lessor."

13

The material provisions of the lease are unambigu.
ous. The breaches by the defendant were undisputed:
the evidence concerning the proper measure of damage~
was undisputed. The error committed by the trial
judge was that he applied the measure of damage~
applicable in condemnation cases rather than the mea~
ure of damages properly applicable to breach of con.
tract.
The evidence showed that defendant's violation vi
the provisions of Paragraph 4 were willful. The defendant Milton C. Nielson was an experienced miner
He admitted that he had engaged in mining operations
for 15 years and he described in some detail the experience he had obtained in various mines in the Four Corners area (Tr. 194-195) . Prior to the time that he
entered into his first lease upon the Pete claims in
1960, he made a number of trips to the mine and made
a detailed examinaton of the drifts, pillars and the
kind of mining operation that had theretofore been
conducted (Tr. 196-198) . lVIelvin Dalton, the Secretary of the plaintiff corporation and one of its director~,
submitted to the defendant a form of lease which had
been used in a prior transaction between the plaintiff
and Mikesell and .Mahon (Tr. 165, 203). The MikesellMahon lease contained a paragraph very similar to
Paragraph 4 of the lease in question. The MikesellMahon lease was taken to Robert Anderson, one of
the attorneys for the defendant in the instant case, and
various suggestions were made by the defendant with
respect to changes. The defendant admitted that terms
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rere <liscusse<l in l\Ir. An<lerson' s off ice (Tr. :lO:l) .
'i'l1e record is uncontradicted that Paragraph 4 of the
UHill lease between plaintiff and defendant differed
from the .l\Iikesell-Mahon lease in that the latter restricted the size of the drift to 8 x 8 ft. an<l required
.tO or 50 ft. pillars; whereas the lease signed allowed
10 ft. <lrifts and provided that the pillars should be
:W ft. square. These changes were made at defendant's
request (Tr. 167; cf para. 4, Exhibit 12). A new
lease under which the litigation arose was executed on
April 1, 1963. Paragraph 4 of these leases is identical.
1

There were certain adjustments and modifications
,11 the provisions with respect to the amount of royalty
;,, be paid in the 1962 and 1963 leases. At no time,
bebveen the 1960 lease and the spring of 1966, however,
did the defendant suggest any change in Paragraph 4
or indicate to the plaintiff in any way that its provisions
were onerous or that he could not comply with them
(Tr. 194).
The defendant was in substantial compliance with
the provisions of the lease, including Paragraph 4,
until approximately one year prior to February of
1966. l\lelvin Dalton testified that he last examined
the mine a year or more prior to February, 1966, and
at that time he walked. through the mine and did not
observe any mining practices that would substantially
<:ontradict Paragraph 4 (Tr. 174, 175). Both Melvin
Dalton and James Menlove testified that mining operations through the period of their last visits were in
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substantial compliance with the lease. The record is
uncontradicted that defendant was furnished with
copies of mining maps from the time he began operations until at least of spring of 1963 (Tr. 17). A map
furnished to defendant in approximately the spring
of 1963 (Tr. 17, Ex. 2) clearly indicates that mining
operations at that time were in substantial compliance.
In February, 1966, Melvin Dalton visited the mine for
the first time in more than twelve months. He was
accompanied by a Bob Hughes (Tr. 177). He observed
substantial violations in newly mined portions of the
property as shown an areas 1, 2, 3 and 4 of plaintiff's
Exhibits 4, 13 and 24 (Tr. 177-178). Mr. Menlove,
the President of the corporation, visited the mine
shortly thereafter. The defendant was served with a
Notice to Quit the property on or about March 30.
1966.

It is undisputed that the defendant's mining
operations subsequent to the last visit to the property
by plaintiff's officers constituted a violation of Para·
graph 4. The areas marked in green on plaintiff's
Exhibits 13 and 24 represent areas from which ore
was removed as a result of stoping or stripping or
failure to leave pillars 20 ft. square or equivalent or
removal of ore from drifts or cross-cuts leaving such
passageways greater than the permitted 10 x 10 ft.
dimensions. The defendant himself testified that his
mining operations proceeded substantially in accordance
with the numerical sequence appearing on defendant's
Exhibit 30. The defendant's expert did not attempt
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to refute plaintiff's evidence to the effect that the lease
was violated in the particulars plaintiff claimed. All
of the mining in the area following No. 171 on Exhibit
;JO necessarily occurred after either James Menlove or
Melvin Dalton examined the mine. It is readily apparent from the exhibit that all or substantially all of
the violations are in areas with numbers greater than
171, and, on defendant's own admissions, the mining had
occurred after plaintiff's officers had inspected the
property.
The court stated unequivocally that he was persuaded that the defendant violated the contract (Tr.
292-293). He stated that he believed the appropriate
measure of damages, however, was reflected in the
opinion of this court in State v. Noble ( 1959) 8 Ut.
2nd 405, 335 P. (2d) 831, (1957) 6 Ut. (2d) 40, 305
P. (2d) 495, a case involving condemnation of a gravel
pit (Tr. 394) . Although Judge Ellett did not cite the
case by name, it is clear from the judge's comments
that he was relying upon the Noble case in reaching his
conclusion. The court indicated at an earlier stage of
the trial that his concept of the damage was the difference between the amount the purchaser would have
paid for the mine before the breach of contract and
afterwards (Tr. 323, 324) . In fact, plaintiff had rested,
based upon the evide:r;i.ce demonstrating the measure
nf damages under the contract concept, when the court
indicated that he believed that principle was not applicable (Tr. 323-325). Thereupon, plaintiff's counsel
offered to recall an expert witness to testify with re17

spect to the amount of damage under the trial court's
theory (Tr. 326-327) .
After receiving additional evidence under the
theory of State v. Noble, the trial court observed that
there was a substantial difference in the testimony running from $5,000 to $45,000 from the expert witnesses
(Tr. 394). He reiterated his position, that the damages to be awarded were by application of State v.
Noble rather than the cases involving breach of contract (Tr. 394). Appellant respectfully submits that
the trial court's theory of damages was erroneous. The
damages recoverable under the contract theory were
uncontradicted. Using the evidence least favorable to
plaintiff, plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum of
$29,188.53, if the proper theory is applied.
The basic policy in awarding damages for a breach
of contract is expressed in McCormick on Damages,
Sec. 137, at 561 ( 1935) :
"In the case of a breach of contract, the goal
of compensation is not the mere restoration to
a former position, as in a tort, but the awarding
of a sum which is the equivalent of performance
of the bargain-the attempt to place the plaintiff in the position he would be in if the contract
had been fulfilled."
This was clearly stated to law of Utah by the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah in Park v. Moorman Mfg.
Co., (1952) 121 Ut. 339, 241 P.2d 914. See also Simpson on Contracts, Sec. 195, at 392 (2d Ed. 1965);
Restatement on Contracts, Sec. 329. State v. Noble,
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(1957) 6 Ut. 2d 40, 305 P.2d 495, (1959) 8 Ut. 405,
;335 P.2d 831, was a condemnation case. The case

relied upon by Judge Ellett does not support his application. In the first opinion, 6 Ut. 2d 40, 305 P.2d 495,
this court reversed the trial court which had permitted
the damages to be calculated for the condemnation of
all the defendant's land on the basis of totaling the
values of individual parts of it. The court stated that
proper measure of damages in condemnation was the
fair market value of the whole tract of land as it would
be sold to a willing buyer by a willing seller. The basic
theory was clearly expressed to be that the value of
individual parts, including minerals, were not to be
considered separately, but rather the value of the condemned parcel as a whole was controlling. This theory
is inappropriate for measuring damages where the
wrongdoing consists of a breach of contract and the
personal property removed in violation of the agreement had a separate, easily established value, distinct
from the value of the land as such.
In Cleary v. Shand, ( 1916) 48 Ut. 640, 161 Pac.
453, the court stated:
"Where the destruction is a permanent injury
to land, it may be that damages may be measured and ascertained by showing the value of
the land before and after the destruction . . .
(but ]. . . If the thing destroyed, although it
is part of the realty, has a value which can be
measured and ascertained without reference to
the value of the soil in which it stands, or out
of which it grows, the recovery must be for
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the value ofthe thing destroyed, and not for the
difference in the value of the land before and
after such destruction." 48 Ut. at 643-44.
This rule has been restated and applied often in Utah
cases, e.g. Bivans v. Utah Land, Water and Power
Co., (1918) 53 Ut. 601, 174 Pac. 1126; Egelhoff v.
Ogden City, ( 1928) 71 Ut. 511, 267 Pac. 1011; Tripp
v. Bagley, (1929) 75 Ut. 42, 282 Pac. 1026; Ogden
Livestock Shows v. Rice, ( 1945) 108 Ut. 228, 159 P.2d
130, cf. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co. v.
llimonos, (10th Cir. 1951) 190 F.2d 1012. In Egelhoff
v. Ogden City, supra, the court rejected the city's assertion that damages to fixtures, considered to be real
property, had to be measured by the decline in the
market value of the property. The court applied the
stated rule and found that the damage to cottages could
be determined without reference to the property's
value decline. Since this could be done, the court found
that the correct measure of damages was the separately
determinable amount.
The application of this principle to the instant
case requires that the damage to the plaintiff be measured by the net value of the ore improperly removed
by the defendant minus the royalty received by the
plaintiff on the ore. That ore had a proven value separate and apart from the decline in value of the land.
If the terms of the contract had been complied with,
the ore would have been left to the plaintiff as its property. To measure the damages to the plaintiff by the
decline in value test is not only contrary to the Utah
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rule. it is also contrary to the theory that governs the
awarding of damages for a breach of a contract. In
fact the defendant would be permitted to profit by
breaching his contract because he would be allowed
to keep the difference between the money he actually
received for the ore and the damages awarded by the
trial court.
In the instant case, the breach consisted of mining
and removing ore which was reserved by the contract
to the plaintiff. Although it involved a tort, Elliff v.
Tcd'on Drilling Co., (1948) 216 S.W.(2d) 824, it is
useful in explaining the difference in the damage concept where plaintiff's loss involved personalty as a
separate and distinct value from the land. In this case
the defendant's negligence had caused an off-set oil
well to explode and catch fire. The fire cratered the
well until it destroyed an oil well, two water wells,
some cattle, grass, and the usefullness of the plaintiffs'
land. The plaintiff sued for these damages and for
destruction of gas and distillate from the hydrocarbon
reservoir under their land. The trial court awarded
damages for all the items claimed because under Texas
law the owner of land has complete ownership of hydrocarbons under it, not qualified, ~der the circumstances
of this type case, by the law of capture. The Court
of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court, 146 Tex.
565, 210 S.W. 2d 553, but that court was in turn reYersed by the Supreme Court of Texas, 210 S.W. 2d
558 ( 1948) , which held that a landowner did have a
right to damages as found by the trial court. How-
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ever, the case was remanded to the Court of Civil
Appeals to consider, among other points, the measure
of damages for the gas and distillate destroyed. J11
this third proceeding the defendant maintained that
the sole measure of damages was by application of the
decline in market value test. Rejecting defendant's
argument, the Court of Civil Appeals stated, 216 S.W.
2d 824 ( 1948), at 830-31:
"Under the Supreme Court's holding, we do
not regard the measure of damages as set forth
in 'First Point - B' (defendant's argument) as
being the exclusive measure of damages applicable to a case of this character. The measure
suggested is the one applicable to suits for injury to real property. We have no doubt that
in cases of injuries, such as that sustained by
appellees here, an action for damages to real
real property would lie and we so held in our
former opinion. Damages recoverable in such
action would be mesaured by the difference in
the values of the property before and after the
injury. \Ve also held in our former opinion that
if appellees were to recover at all under the
facts of this case, it must be as and for damages to real estate. This holding was reversed by
the Supreme Court. That Court decided appellees were entitled to relief under another and
additional theory, that is, that appellees could
recover as and for the taking and destruction
of gas and distillate which appellees owned or
in which they had a property interest. The cliff erence of opinion between this court and the
Supreme Court is neither narrow nor elusive,
but is broad and fundamental. It goes to the
concept of the nature of the action. The theory
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of the action necessarily indicates to some extent
the factors which must be considered in ascertaining damages. A proper standard for the
measure of damages to real property is inappropriate for measuring damages for the destruction of personal property. It would be anomolous to say that appellees could elect to recover
as and for gas taken and destroyed rather than
for injury to real property, but that having
made such an election, their damages would
nevertheless be governed by the same measure
as that relating to damages to real property .
.For all practical purposes, it would restrict the
appellees to an action for injury to real property
and nullify the Supreme Court's holding."
Appellant submits that this reasoning should govern
the instant case. 'i\That the plaintiff sought to recover
iu its First Cause of Action in No. 2714 was damages
for the ore taken by the defendant in violation of
the contract terms. As was pointed out supra at page 20
the Supreme Court of Utah approved plaintiff's
theory in Egelhoff v. Ogden City. It should also be
remembered that plaintiff and defendant signed the
contract in which the primary subject matter was the
ore. The ore, not the freehold, was the object of the
parties' bargain. Damages should be measured in the
terms contemplated by the parties. A contrary result
would allow defendant a windfall profit by his breach
of contract. This court held in the case of Sprague
'1 1• Boyles Bros. Drillin,q Co., (1956) 4 Ut. 2d 344,
294 P.2d 689, that where the parties make a contract
with known facts and objects in mind, damages which
are based upon these known facts, though not an actual
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part of the contract between them, justify an award
of damages in the light of the known facts and objec.
tives. This principle is applicable to the instant case
for the same reasons. The parties contemplated tht
economics of mining in their negotiations. When defendant stated that an adjustment was required tu
mine under the earlier leases, adjustments were made
in the royalty scale not in the provision restricting his
right to remove pillars, prohibiting stoping, and limiting the size of drifts (Tr. 194. cf. Exs. 12, 13, and 14
with the 1963 lease).
The instant case presents a factual situation where
the application of the value differential rule is particularly inappropriate: First, because under the control-damage theory, damages are capable of separate
measure and computation, whereas the N able theory
damages are less precise, more speculative and less
susceptible to definitive proof. They are, as the record
here shows, only provable by expert opinion evidence.
Secondly, because the value differential rule, if applied,
would lead to a result that is unjust both in terms
of the contractual agreement between the parties and
in terms of the real loss to the plaintiff. Third, because
the ore was, as was pointed out by the Texas Court,
personalty, even though it would have been left at·
tached to the land if there had been no wrongdoing
by the defendant, and the awarding of damages under
a theory which disregards the economic facts cannot
compensate for the loss sustained by reason of the
breach of contract. And finally, because the basic theory
24

f awarding damages, to put the plaintiff in that position he would have occupied had there been no breach
tJf contract, would be thwarted by the awarding of
damages under a theory where the loss is manifestly
insignificant by comparison with the performance
plaintiff had a legal right to expect.
11

Suppose a tenant of a farm executed an agreement
with the land owner to the effect that the tenant had
the right to remove the fruit from apple trees, but that
the land owner retained the right to the fruit from the
peach trees. In violation of the agreement, suppose
the tenant removed the fruit from both of the trees.
Applying Judge Ellet's theory of damages, the land
owner could not recover damages based upon the value
of the peaches less the cost of picking them. He would
be limited to the speculative, meaningless and unrealistic difference between the value of the land before
and after the peaches were removed. In the mining
business, blocked out and inferred ore has an economic
value as clearly definable as unpicked peaches. Certainly, the analogy demonstrates that the application
of State v. Noble is inapposite.
The amount of damages to be awarded under the
contract theory was proved with reasonable certainty.
The defendant removed 3,031 tons more than the ore
to which he was entitled under Paragraph 4 after
making the deduction for the tonnage in the ceiling
of Area No. 1 in accordance with Judge Ellett's suggestion (Tr. 120-124, 137, Ex. 25, Tr. 393). The
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mine map from which these calculations were made wa~
Yerified is substantially accurate by the defendant's ex.
pert witness (Tr. 312). The settlement sheets show tht
twerage grade of the ore to be .2384% U30s, and the
purchase price per ton, without haulage, to be $19.35.
Thus, the sales price of the ore unlawfully removed
was $58,649.85 (Tr. 120-124, Exs. 7, 15). The highest
figure in the record representing the cost of removal
comes from the expert testimony of Samuel Arentz.
His judgment was that the cost would be $6.75 per ton
(Tr. 129). The haulage cost was paid by the mill
directly as a separate item, and since it is not included
in the receipts there is no purpose in including the
figure in the cost of mining. Thus, the amount which
the plaintiff could have reasonably made as profit on
the ore should have been left in the Pete mine under
the terms of the contract was $38,109.60. Reducing
this amount by the royalties received, plaintiff's damage
was $29,188.54.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
DETER:\IIN"E THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER SUBSTANTIAL
DA.MAGE BASED UPON THE SECOND
CAUSE OF ACTION IN NO. 2714.
Prior to the lease with defendant the plaintiff
possessed the right to recover all ores in the Pete
Claims. Plaintiff surrendered to defendant only to
the extent specifically defined in the contract. De·
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fendant acquired a license to mine only those ores that
fell within the provisions of Paragraph 4 of the lease.
That which the plaintiff retained and the defendant
received under the lease was specifically and explicitly
go-rerned by Paragraph 4 of the lease, quoted supra
at pp. 3, '1<. '¥hen the defendant violated this section, he
trespassed upon property reserved by the lessor to
itself. Defendant converted the ore reserved to the
plaintiff. In fact, the evidence in the instant case conclusively established that the defendant knew that the
ore was being extracted in violation of the lease and
that this was being done willfully and knowingly. The
breach of contract, the trespass, the conversion were
all willful. The evidence also established that the purpose of Paragraph 4, known to both parties, was to
make the lease a development type lease whereby the
defendant was permitted to perform exploratory and
development operations upon the mine so long as all
of the ore specifically reserved to the lessor was to be
left for future mine operations. The defendant was
entitled to only that ore uncovered in his exploratory
and development operations. The record also shows
that this clause was not only an operative part of the
two leases between the parties governing the defendant's operations prior to the one violated by the defendant, it also shows that the defendant's attorneys
had rejected it in its original form and had redrafted
it into the form embodied in Paragraph 4. This conduct indicates a specific understanding of the clause,
its purposes and its limitations. It also indicates that
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it would be construed, if any construction were re.
quired, against the drafter-defendant.
In the case of Lewis v. Stewart, (1951) 203 Ok]
349, 230 P.2d 455, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
decided a case analogous to the instant one. The parties
had executed a lease which reserved the coal pillars to
the lessor. Following a cave-in at a low level which
prevented the lessee from further development of the
mine, the lessee pulled all the pillars. The lessor
brought suit against the lessee on the theory that the
lessee had converted the coal from the pillars to its
own use. The court held that the lessee had converted
the coal and that lessor was entitled to recover on this
theory despite the lessee's evidence to the effect that
good mining practices required the removal of the
pillars after a cave-in made further development of
the mine impracticable. In fact, he testified that the
only reason for leaving the pillars was to keep the mine
open and workable, and since the cave-in prevented
future work, there was no need, as well as it being
good mining practice, to leave them in place. The
court stated:
"The prohibition in the lease is positive, and
in effect amounted to a reservation of the coal
in the pillars to the lessor. Whether or not any
good purpose would be served by leaving them
in the mine in its then condition was a question
to be determined by the lessors, and not to the
lessee." 230 P.2d at 459 (emphasis added).
The court held that this conversion justified the plaintiffs in their termination of the lease.
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Just as the violation of the lease in Lewis v. Stewart
,rns held to be a conversion of minerals reserved to
the lessor, the defendant has converted ores reserved
to the plaintiff by violating the terms of the lease in
the case currently before the court. Since the evidence
mdicated that this ore had a substantial value, the trial
court erred in not only failing to recognize the conversion of the plaintiff's ore, it erred in not awarding
damages in accordance with Utah law.
In Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture, Inc., ( 1957)
ti Ut. 2d 385, 314 P. 2d 842, this court held that where

one went upon the claim (land) of another and removed valuable minerals, and the trespasser converted
minerals, the owner was entitled to recover. This court
reversed the trial court which had refused to award
damages and entered an order for compensatory damages in the amount established by the record. 'Vhen
the defendant in the instant case mined ores reserved
to the plaintiff, he was trespassing and converting
just as was done by the defendant in Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture case. The court there said:
"This court has previously announced that
when there is wrongful injury and substantial
damage, just compensation should be awarded
therefor." 6 Ut. 2d at 392.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated:
"The Utah courts have recognized that as a
general rule the measure of damages for the
conversion of property is the value of the property at the time of conversion, plus interest.
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Raycroft v. Adams, 82 Ut. 347, 24 P. 2d lllo
Columbia Trust Co. v. Farmers' & l\:Ierchant.1:
Bank, 82 Ut. 117, 22 P. 2d 164; Truitt v. Patten
75 Ut. 567, 287 Pac. 175; 'Vestern Securitie:
Co. v. Silyver King Consol. .Mining Co., 57 (t.
88, 192 Pac. 664". Nephi Processing Plant 1.·
Talbott, 247 F. 2d 771 (10th Cir. 1957) at 77j,
This rule was restated and applied by this court in
the more recent case of Lowe v. Rosenloff, ( 1961) 12
Ut. 2d 190, 364 P. 2d 418.
The State of Utah has enacted a statute which
adopts a public policy that extends the common law
concept of damages for conversion of ore. Sec. 40-1-12,
U.C.A., 1953, provides:
" ... any person who, wrongfully entering
upon any mine or mining claim and carrying
away ores therefrom, or wrongfully extractinr;
and selling ores from any mine, having knowledge of the existence of adverse claimants in any
mine, and without notice to them, knowingly
and willfully trespasses in or upon such mine
or mining claim and extracts or sells ore therefrom shall be liable to the owners of such ore
for three times the value thereof without any
deductions either for labor bestowed or expenses
incurred in removing, transporting, selling or
preparing said ore, or its mineral content for
market." (Emphasis added) .
The statute is an explicit recognition of the policy
in this state to inhibit the wrongful conversion of ore;
to discourage trespass upon mining property; to protect owners of mines against the kind of conduct which
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occurred in the instant case. It is to be noted that the
statute requires trebling of the value of the ores taken
with no credit allowed the trespasser for expenses
incurred in removing the same. The policy behind this
,tatute is that of requiring any disputed rights to
minerals to be resolved by the courts of the state before, not after, they have been removed. The plaintiff
submits that the trial court erred in failing to find
from the facts that the defendant trespassed upon
lauds and minerals reserved to the plaintiff, converting ores to his own use. The court also erred in failing
to apply the strict sanctions designed to encourage
compliance with the statute.
The compiler of the 1953 Code has cited two cases applying this section of the code: Stephen Hays Estate,
Inc. v. Togliatti, ( 1934) 85 Ut. 137, 38 P. 2d 1066;
Utah Copper Co. v. Montana Bingham Consol. Mining Co., (1927) 69 Ut. 423, 255 P. 672. Both the cases
involved defendants who were extracting copper from
water which passed over their lands. Neither case involved a direct trespass, but since both cases considered
conflicting rights to minerals in the absence of a blatant
act, appellant submits that the holding of these cases
reflects a state policy whereby the rights in minerals
being protected were absolute and that conduct violating the provision need not be an old fashioned "claim
jump" but could be a more subtle invasion of rights.
The question involved in each of these cases was certainly more finely defined and less overt that the trespass of defendant Nielson in the instant case.
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Examination of the collateral references listed
by the compiler under Sec. 40-1-12 leads to the 'Va~h
ington cases construing a code provision governill11
wrongful cutting of trees which is in language similar
to our statute governing minerals. Blake v. Gra 11 1
(1964) 65 'Vash. 2d 410, 397 P. 2d 843; Mullally r.
Parks, ( 1948) 29 'V ash. 2d 899, 190 P. 2d 107; Lau_· .
.wn v. Helmich, (1944) 20 'Vash. 2d 167, 146 P. ~d
;)37. The statutes involved are R.C.,V.A. Secs. 64.12.040. The statutes are similar in that they are enacted
by the peoples of the states to protect particular right\
in special resources of the state. In Mullally v. Parks.
supra, the court trebled the damages where the de·
fendant cut down the trees in question knowing that
there was a dispute concerning their ownership. The
court analyzed the application of the statute as follows:
~

" ... they ... well illustrate the principle that
where the trespass is without lawful authorit~.
the tort feasor will be subject to treble the
amount of damages assessed, unless it be shown
that the trespass was casual or involuntary, or
that the trespasser has probable cause to believe that the land on which the trespass was
committed was his own." 190 P. 2d. 107, 110.
The only difference between the Washington statutes
and 40-1-12 UCA, other than subject matter, is that
the 'Vashington statutes more carefully describe what
will be considered to be a good faith trespass and, as
such, will prevent the trebling of the damages. The
policy of the statutes is the same: One proceeding

32

without lawful authority and with scienter is liable
for treble damages. That rule applied to the facts of
the instant case show that the defendant converted Lhe
ores of the plaintiff was willfully and knowingly; he
f;new them to be reserved to the plaintiff.
The uncontradicted evidence is that the gross
ralue of the ore wrongfully removed (i.e., without
deduction for moving or hauling expense) was $73,:319.89. Of this amount $11,267.97 in value was remoYed after plaintiff gave notice to quit the premises.
POINT III.
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
FOR THE UNLA\VFUL DETAINER OF
THE PETE MINE BETWEEN APRIL 1, 1966
~lND DECEMBER 16, 1966 AS A :MATTER OF
LA\V.
As is shown in the record and pointed out in Point
I, the undisputed evidence shows the defendant violated the provision of the lease on the Pete claims as
set forth in Paragraph 4 of that agreement. The last
sentence of Paragraph 4 provides:
"Failure to comply with the terms of this
paragraph shall constitute justification to the
lessor
to cancel this lease without notice to les,,
see.
It is undisputed that on March 30, 1966, the defendant was served with a notice of termination of the
lease on the grounds that he had failed to comply
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with the terms and prons1ons of the paragraph. De.
mand was made upon him to quit the premises. (Ex.
hibit B to Complaint in No. 2715). It is undisputed
that defendant did not surrender the premises to tht
plaintiff at any time prior to the last day of the trial.
Sec. 78-36-3, U.C.A., 1953, provides:
"A tenant of real property, for a term les)
than life, is guilty of unlawful detainer:
(I) when he continued in possession, in person or by sub-tenant, of the property, or am
part thereof, after the expiration of the ter~1
for which it is let to him

* * * *

( 5) \Vhen he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a neglect or a failure to perform any condition or covenant of
the lease or agreement under which the property is held, other than those hereinbefore men·
tioned, and after notice in writing requiring in
the alternative the performance of such conditions or covenant or the surrender of the prop·
erty, served upon him, and, if there is a sub·
tenant in actual occupation of the premises, also
upon such subtenant, shall remain uncomplie<l
with for five days after service thereof. \Vi thin
three days after the service of the notice the
tenant, or any subtenant in actual occupation
of the premises, or any mortgagee of the term.
or other persons interested in its continuance.
may perform such condition or covenant and
thereby save the lease from forfeiture; provided,
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease
violated b7; the lessee cannot afterwards be per·
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formed, then no notice as last prescribed herein
need be given." (Emphasis added).

Cnder the terms of the lease upon the Pete property,
defendant's lease terminated at the time he violated
the provisions of Paragraph 4. This court held in
Forrester v. Cook, ( 1930) 77 Ut. 137, 292 P. 206,
that the parties may, by agreement, change the procedure for termination without rendering the statute
any less applicable (77 Ut. at 153) and if this is done,
the effect of the statute will be as though the statutory
procedure were followed. Even if there were not so,
however, no alternative notice would have been required under the "provided" clause of Sec. 78-36-3
,5) C.C.A., 1953, since it would have been impossible
t'or the defendant to have complied with the lease rellllirements, i.e., to replace the converted ore. It is
apparent from the language of Paragraph 4 that the
parties contemplated strict compliance with its terms.
Whereas the lease contained a provision that two weeks'
written notice should be given of other violations, a
violation of the provisions of Paragraph 4 required
no notice of default under the explicit language of the
contract. (See Ex. B, para. 12).
The unlawful detainer of defendant in the instant
case was particularly flagrant. During the first ten
days of the illegal detention, he unlawfully removed
$11,269.97 worth of ore from the mine. Thereafter,
he ref used to surrender the property to the plaintiff,
thus preventing plaintiff from obtaining any economic
return from its lawful property. At a hearing in
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August, plaintiff offered to operate the mine anr.
account to defendant if the plaintiff's claim to posse~
sion was determined to be unfounded. Def en<larn
refused said offer under the dog-in-the-manger theor.
that if he could not mine the property, then he wou]~
not permit anyone else to do so either.
There is no question that forcible entry an<l de·
tainer statutes apply to mineral leases. 107 A.L.R
661; Foster v. Black, ( 1918) 20 Ariz. 64, 176 P. 845
Economic return to an owner of mining property neces·
sarily involves the removal of the minerals involved
It is obvious that denial of this right necessarily cause,
direct economic damages to the owner. This court ha.,
frequently held that damages for unlawful detainer
are based on the fair and reasonable value of the right
to property. This rationale is well illustrated in the
case of Forrester v. Cook, supra, where the defendant
maintained that the statute allowed damages only a~
distinct from rent, and, as the plaintiff's only loss was
unpaid rent, the judgment should not be trebled. In
analysis of the statute and concepts involved, the court
stated:
"'Vhile damages may not be restricted to
the rental value, and may include more, yet
the rental value during the unlawful withhold·
ing of possession is the minimum of damages."
The court rejected defendant's contention reasoning
that the rent ref erred to (in what today would be Sec.
78-36-10 governing damages and trebling of the same)
in the statute would be rent due before commencement
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uf the unlawful detainer, holding that once the unlawful withholding commenced, the fair rental value was
;1 minimum damage, though there could be more, as
the quoted sentence states. This analysis is applicable
to the instant case where the denial to the plaintiff
of its right to remove the ores in its property is a clear
minimum of damage. As this is measured in its minimal
amount by the average monthly royalties and rent
reeeIYed by the plaintiff, this should be the minimum
tlamage suffered. Such rentals, in the sum of $1,045.00
per month should be awarded for each month of unlawful detainer.
Then, as was first held in Eccles v. Union Pacific
Curd Co., (1897) 15 Ut. 14, 48 Pac. 148, and reaffirmed
ill Forrester v. Cook, supra, the sum found to be such
damages must be trebled as the legally imposed penalty
for the unlawful withholding of plaintiff's property,
as the court said in Eccles v. Union Pacific Coal Co.,
15 Ut. at 19:
"The judgments rendered are conclusive that
the appellant was entitled to possession of the
premises at the time of the alleged forcible detainer; that such detainer was forcible; that the
damages assessed were for the unlawful detainer
alleged in the complaint. So that the only further
question for us to consider is whether the damages found by the jury should have been trebled
by the court. * * * Under this section (today
Sec. 78-36-10) if possession is asked for, and
the proof justifies it, judgment of restitution
is to be awarded. If the proceedings are for
unlawful detainer, after neglect or failure to
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perform the conditions of the lease, or aftt
default in payment of rent, judgment is to f1
awarded which shall declare a forfeiture of th·
lease * * * If judgment is rendered agaiust,
defendant guilty of forcible entry or fonihJ,
and unlawful detainer, judgment for three timl
the amount of the damages assessed therefor
and for the rent due, if any should be entered,
and 15 Ut. at 21:
"This action was properly brought under Sec
3787 (today Sec. 78-36-3) which deals with tlJ,

subject of forcible entry and detainer; and "'·
see no ,·:did reason why the damages found for
forcible detainer should not be trebled bv tht
court, as provided by the act. Under the mithor
ities there seems to be no escape from this result. The plaintiff is entitled to have the damages for forcible and unlawful detainer trebled
by the court with costs."
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
A ARD ED THE PLAINTIFF REASON·
ABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES AS THIS 'VAS
REQUIRED BY THE CONTRACT BET,VEEN THE PARTIES.

°"r

Though the lump sum award of the trial court
makes it difficult to assess, the affidavit of the plain·
tiff's attorney shows that the trial court failed to award
reasonable attorney's fees to the plaintiff, although
such an award \Vas required by the contract between
the parties. In Slim Olson, Inc. v. TVinegar, (1952)
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Ct. 80, 246 P. 2d 608, this court held that where
a contract contains a clause requiring one to pay all
costs of enforcing a contract, the clause would be enforced and the defendant required to pay the same.
This rule was examined again in Pacific Coast Title
[ns. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indemn. Co., (1958) 7
n. 2d 377' 325 p. 2d 906, where the court found that
1mder an indemnification bond suit, attorney's fees
11ould have to be included as foreseeable expenses if
the contractor failed to perform because attorney's
fees "'ould be clearly involved in settling the disputes
that would arise from said failure to perform. The
general statement of the governing rule was made in
JJlake v. Blake, (1966) 17 Ut. 2d. 369, 412 P. 2d 454:
"As a general rule, attorney's fees are not
recoverable as damages in either actions on contract or in torts if there is no statutory or contractual authority for such fees." 17 Ut. 2d at
372.

The contract between plaintiff and defendant proYided for the payment of attorneys' fees if suit was
required to enforce it. Therefore, it falls clearly under
the rules enunciated above, that is, the contract clause
requiring payment of reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing the contract should be required
of the defendant. Slim Olsen, Inc. v. Wingear, supra.
It should be noted, however, that the fees thus
claimed are for the enforcement of the contract as
described in Point I of this brief, and not for the damages claimed for the unlawful detainer of plaintiff's
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property, which damages are separate and distitit
from those resulting from defendant's breach of n,
lease agreement. Plaintiff recognizes that under Szi:w
v. Salt Lake Real Estate & Investment Co., ( l9j,j
a Ut. 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709, and Forrester v. Cool,
supra, it is not entitled to attorneys' fees under th'
unlawful detainer part of this action, and those attor
neys' fees claimed are those which are incurred pur.
suant to that part of this action under the contract
damages theory.
Plaintiff also respectfully submits that those at.
torney's fees claimed by plaintiff, as described in the
affidavit of plaintiff's attorney, were those fees incurred in attempting to enforce the contract and pre·
paring the plaintiff's case for trial. As is stated in Z.i
C.J.S., Damages, Sec. 50, P. 785:
"As a general rule, contract provisions for tht
allowance of attorney fees are construed to in·
elude both trial and appellate fees."
This rule is elaborated on in 52 A.L.R. 2d 860, where
special attention is invited to Sec. 3 (b), pp. 866-67,
governing the situation currently before the court in
the instant case. Pursuant to this authority, plaintiff·
appellant moves the court to award such additional
fees as are reasonable for the prosecution of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
After :Melvin Dalton and James Menlove ex·
amined the Pete mine in the Spring of 1966, they con·
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fronted the defendant with the fact that his operations
during the past year had substantially violated the
proYisions of Paragraph 4 ..Mr. Nielson replied to the
effect that Paragraph 4 should never have been in the
]ease; that there was no court in the land that would
Jpply it (Tr. 106). Perhaps more than any other single
part of the evidence, this conversation characterizes
the willful, flagrant nature of the defendant's violations. Notwithstanding the defendant's knowledge of
and experience in the mining business, and notwithstanding the fact that changes in Paragraph 4 were
initially made at the defendant's request, he flaunted
the terms of the paragraph in the facts of the plaintiff's officers and directors. The defendant admitted
on cross examination that as late as 1965, he realized
that he would have to have the consent of the plaintiff
before he extracted ore in violation of the provisions
of Paragraph 4 (Tr. 262-263). He admitted that he
obtained no permission for taking any ore from the
mine after the conversation with respect to the shooting
of the ore from the ceiling in Area No. I (Tr. 262) .
He testified that he realized that the plaintiff's owners
"trusted to my judgment" (Tr. 263).
The record in this case establishes clearly that
plaintiff's reliance upon the defendant's integrity and
honesty in mining the Pete mine was misplaced. On
the breach of contract theory the plaintiff is entitled
to be placed by this court in the position it would have
enjoyed if the defendant had performed the contract.
Failure to apply the correct measure of damages for
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breach of contract requires reversal of the trial ju<l,
with respect to the amount of damages on the contra,
theory. It is submitted that the circumstances of ti.
case justify the application of the provisions of sl
tion 40-1-12 of the Utah Code, and to require an awar
for damages upon the tort theory. Defendant shou
also be held responsible for his unlawful detainer
the property.
Appellant submits that there is no occasion fo
a new trial; no new evidence could be presented at
ne\v trial which is not contained substantially in \\,,
record in the instant case. The application of the propt
legal principles to the undisputed facts justify tb,
court in making a direct computation and award
damages without any further proceeding in the Di~
trict Court. After a determination of the proper lega
theories, if this court should come to the conclusio1
that any uncertainty exists in appropriate amoun
of damages, it should appoint a referee for the soh
purpose of determining the appropriate amounts rather
than remitting the case for additional proceedings i11
San Juan County.

1

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2Gt11
day of April, 1967.
GEORGE M. McMILLAN
and DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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